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THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING AND
EXCLUSIONARY SUBDIVISION CONTROL

1.

INTRODUCTION

A considerable number of American communities have adopted
zoning laws which have had the effect of preventing ethnic and
racial minorities as well as the poor from moving into a
suburb or a particular section of a city.1 Yet it is becoming
increasingly clear that exclusionary zoning is not the only means
available to achieve this end. A second, but less well-known
exclusionary practice is subdivision control.
In a city which has enacted both zoning and subdivision control
ordinances, a developer of a proposed low-income housing project
faces two barriers before his project will be approved. First, he
must meet the generally well-defined requirements of the city's
zoning law. Second, he must comply with the ill-defined and often
completely discretionary requirements of a subdivision control
ordinance. For example, although the developer's project might
meet the height, minimum lot size, and locational requirements of
the zoning law, the planning board or commission which administers the subdivision control ordinance might find that the project
will overtax the sewage and drainage capabilities of the area or
cause too great an increase in the flow of traffic-highly subjective
determinations.
This article will examine both exclusionary zoning and subdivision control with a view toward analyzing the assumptions common to both types of laws. The operative differences between
exclusionary zoning and subdivision control may be non-existent.
If this is truly the case, the judicial response to each practice
should be the same.
II. THE PROBLEM
Only the areas outside major cities remain available for the
construction of low and moderate income housing on a large
I For discussions of exclusionary zoning, see Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal
Proiection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645 (1971); Symposium-Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 465 (1971); Legislative Development, Snob Zoning: Developments in
Massachusetts and New Jersey, 7 HARV. J. LEGIS. 246 (1970).
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scale. The supply of vacant land in cities has greatly diminished,
and the cost of purchasing land and removing existing structures
often raises the cost of housing beyond the means of many persons. 3 Urban renewal, once considered the savior of our inner
cities, 4 has forced many city residents to attempt to move away
from the central area.5 Yet, data indicate that only wealthier
Whites are able to take full advantage of opportunities in the
suburbs, 6 while low-income Whites and Blacks have concentrated
in ever-increasing numbers in the city. For example in 1950, 34
percent of all Whites and 43 percent of all non-Whites lived in
cities; 7 by 1968 the percentage of Whites living in cities had
declined to 26 percent and the number of non-Whites had increased to 55 percent. In 1978, it has been projected that 22
percent of all Whites and 61 percent of all Blacks will be living in
the city. 8
The migration of industry to the suburbs has compounded this
problem. Job opportunities have moved to suburban areas beyond
the reach of poorer inner city inhabitants. 9 Moreover, because of
the resulting decrease in the tax base, cities have been forced to
reduce the amount and quality of public services. 10
In order to solve these problems, state and local governments
must insure that low-income groups have the opportunity to move
into the suburbs and must at the same time discontinue the practice of concentrating low-income housing projects within the already overcrowded and poor core cities. This idea is by no means
novel; it has been referred to as "dispersal" or "scattered-site"
housing 1 and has recently received favorable comment from the
2
THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT
HOME 139 (The Kaiser Report, 1969) [hereinafter cited as KAISER REPORT].

For example, in 1940, 64 percent of the land was vacant in Los Angeles; by 1960 that
figure had dropped to 31 percent. Statistics show that in 1955, only 4 percent of all the
land in Washington, D.C. was vacant, while in 1954, that figure for Detroit was only 8
percent.
3 Id. at 140-42.
4 S. GRIER, URBAN RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES 13-34 (1965).
5 H. GAUs, THE FAILURE OF UR3AN RENEWAL 4 (American Jewish Committee Com-

mentary Report, 1965).
6
The median income of those Whites living in the central city is approximately $2,000
less than the median income of Whites living in the suburbs. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 318 (197 1).
7 KAISER REPORT, supra note 2, at 40.
8 Id. at 40.

9 An example of the extent of this burden was reported in the New York Times, Jan. 29,
197 1, at 1, col. I. In the Ford assembly plant in Mahwah, New Jersey, the average worker
who commutes to work must travel approximately thirty miles to reach the factory. This
represents a cost of about $1,000 per year for each commuter, a significant financial
burden.
10
New York Times, Jan. 23, 1971, at 1, col. 7.
1 New York Times, Sept. 23, 1971, at I, col. 6.
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federal government.' 2 Nevertheless, exclusionary zoning and subdivision control may be used to impede the use of this approach.
III.

THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF ZONING AND
SUBDIVISION CONTROL

Public restrictions on the use of private property originated
with the failure of private contractual restrictions to prevent
industry from encroaching upon residential sections of our
cities.' 3 Although these private covenants were incorporated in
the contracts of some landowners to satisfy their desire to keep
the property residential, it is improbable that restrictive covenants
were ever meant to provide a system of comprehensive land use
control. 14 In any event, by the early 1900's industrial development had led to instability of property values in many areas and
to urban decay, 15 and it had become apparent that public land use
control was the only way to preserve the integrity of residential
areas.16

When zoning, the first means of public land use control, 17 began
to receive widespread attention, most legal commentators argued
that it was merely an extension of the common law doctrine of
nuisance.' 8 The only appreciable difference, they argued, was that
zoning is a means for the municipality, not the court, to declare
that certain land uses are nuisances. 19 The United States Supreme Court formally adopted the extension of the common law
nuisance argument in 1926, when it upheld the constitutionality of
zoning in Vilige of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,2 0 a landmark
12 Id. Scattered site housing received an unexpected boost when the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) recently ruled that a subsidized housing project
in Philadelphia which had previously been approved should have been rejected. HUD
claimed that the project would increase segregation and compound existing social problems within the city. HUD's ruling was understood to have been based upon new
guidelines just formulated within the department.
13 E. BASSETT, ZONING 317 (National Municipal League Technical Pamphlet Series No.
5, 1922).
14 ld.
15 R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 3 (1966). It has been suggested that the impetus for

modem zoning regulations emanated from New York City's Fifth Avenue merchants, who
were afraid that the garment industry would further encroach upon their elegant shopping
district.
16 Id. at 3- 18.
17 E. BASSETT, supra note 13, at 318- 26.
18 R. BABCOCK, supra note 15, at 4. Contra, E. BASSETT, ZONING 93 (Russell Sage
Foundation, 1940).
19 R. BABCOCK, supra note 15, at 3- 18.
20 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
The Supreme Court pointed out per Justice Sutherland:
Thus the question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a
building of a particular kind or for a particular use, like the question whether

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 5:2

case which cleared the way for massive acceptance of zoning
21
regulations by municipalities.
While the historical setting from which zoning first evolved is
drastically different from the-present setting, the nature of zoning
has remained unchanged: it is still a tool for selective inclusion
and exclusion of certain land use practices. In recent years, however, zoning has been examined in a new light-a light which
focuses on its exclusionary effects. 2 2 Exclusionary zoning may be
defined as that practice which results in closing the suburban
housing market to low and moderate income families. Although
exclusionary zoning takes many forms, it is most often exemplified in minimum lot2 3 and floor area 24 requirements and
prohibitions against certain types or all forms of multi-family
dwellings. 2 5 Although not discriminatory on their face, these re26
quirements and prohibitions may have discriminatory effects.
From the beginning, then, zoning has been considered a means
to promote orderly land use and stabilize property values. Subdivision control on the other hand has different roots. Early laws
regarding subdivisions simply called for the recording of plats to
prevent uncertainty with respect to land titles. 2 7 Subdivision con-

trol, as we know it today, did not get its major impetus until 1924
when Secretary of Commerce Hoover appointed a committee on
city planning and zoning. One of the primary purposes of this
a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined, not by an abstract
consideration of the building or of the thing considered apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the locality. [Citations
omitted]. A nuisance may be the right thing in the wrong place-like a pig in
the parlor instead of the barnyard. [ld. at 388.]
21 Blair, Is Zoning a Mistake, 14 ZONING DIGEST 249, 249- 50 (1962).
22 See authorities cited in note I supra.
2 See Becker, Police Power and Minimum Lot Size Zoning-Part I-Method of
Analysis, WASH. U. L. Q. 263 (1969); Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969).
24 See Note, Building Size, Shape and Placement Regulations: Bulk Control Zoning
Reexamined, 60 YALE L.J. 506 (195 1).
25 See, e.g., Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925) (upholding validity of ordinance prohibiting construction of multi-family dwellings); Babcock
& Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1040
(1963).
26 See, e.g., Davidoff& Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs Toward Inclusionary Land Use
Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 509, 520-22 (1971), for a brief discussion of discriminatory effects of various exclusionary devices.
27 Reps. Control of Land Subdivision by Municipal Planning Boards, 40 CORNELL L. Q.
258 (1955).
An example of early subdivision legislation is I Terr. Laws 816 (1821) which was
enacted in the Michigan Territory in 1821. For an excellent examination of public control
of land subdivisions in Michigan, see Cunningham, Public Control of Land Subdivision in
Michigan: Description and Critique, 66 MICH. L. REV. 3 (1968). Municipalities have also
attempted to use subdivision ordinances to shift part of the cost of developing new public
facilities necessitated by residential growth to land developers and ultimately the home
purchaser. Johnston, Developments in Land Use Control, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 399
(1970).
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committee was to draft a model city planning enabling act which
was to embody a comprehensive approach to subdivision control.2 8 Four years later this model act was published, and soon
29
was enacted by a large number of municipalities.
The model act designates the city's planning commission as the
subdivision control agency.3 0 The first task of that agency is to
adopt regulations establishing standards of subdivision control, 3 1
which may provide for the proper arrangement of streets and
sewer and water facilities, as well as adequate space for utilities,
recreation, light and air, and traffic.3 2 Only after these regulations
have been adopted may the agency begin approving subdivision
plats. 33 Today, most subdivision control agencies still operate
under enabling acts similar to the model drafted by the Hoover
committee,3 4 although each state has attempted to tailor the model
35
to its own particular needs.
Thus, the purpose of subdivision control acts today is no longer
limited to an attempt to assure good land titles; rather, like zoning,
the acts are concerned with the development of standards for
ordered land use. Concommitantly, in deciding whether a subdivision plat meets established standards, the subdivision control
agency may have a great deal of discretion -a discretion that can
be easily used for exclusionary purposes and that is not easy to
36
reverse.
IV.

ZONING OR SUBDIVISION

CONTROL:

HEADS OR TAILS?

Although both subdivision regulations and zoning ordinances
28

Reps. supra note 27, at 259.

29 A survey taken in 1934 points out that 269 boards in 29 states were given power to

regulate subdivisions.

NATIONAL

PLANNING

BOARD,

FEDERAL

EMERGENCY

TRATION OF PUBLIC WORKS, STATUS OF CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING IN

ADMINIS-

THE UNITED

STATES, APPENDIX H (Eleventh Circular Letter, May 15, 1934), cited in Reps, supra note
27, at 259.
30 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CITY PLANNING AND ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMECE,

A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT tit. II., § 12 (1928).
31 Id.
32

§ 14.

Id. § 14.

33Id.§
34 Reps,

35

12.
supra note 27, at 259.

Some states require the municipal planning board to submit its regulations and

standards to a legislative body for approval. Other states, e.g., Maine, require only that

approval be given by the town's planning board, an administrative agency, and that this
approval be based upon a subdivision's "compliance with municipal ordinances and its
general reasonableness." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4956 (1964).
a8Those states which have statutes similar to Maine's allow a planning board to

disapprove a plat either because it does not meet good land use requirements or it is
generally unreasonable. Because of a lack of a definitive standard as to what constitutes
good land use and what is reasonable, a plaintiff is apt to have a difficult time proving that

the board abused its discretion.
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may at times embrace a common goal, they involve two distinct
statutory systems3 7 A municipality's subdivision and zoning ordinances frequently differ with respect to the timing of their application to a propsed subdivision. Many city ordinances require that
a proposed subdivision meet all zoning regulations before the
subdivision control agency is legally bound to decide whether a
particular use conforms to subdivision standards. 3 8 If the proposed subdivision has not met the city's zoning requirements,
further inquiry as to whether the plat should be approved by the
subdivision control agency is unnecessary. A second difference
between zoning and subdivision control is that zoning ordinances
are aimed at controlling the type of building or use intended for
the property; subdivision control is aimed at controlling the manner in which land is divided and made ready for a building or a
39
particular use.

Nevertheless, upon closer analysis these distinctions tend to
disappear. Before an area is zoned for a particular use, the zoning
board must first ascertain whether that area is physically suited
for that use and whether the present or reasonably anticipated
level of public services (that is, streets, utilities, fire and police
protection, etc.) is adequate to meet successfully the additional
demands that full use of the area might entail. 40 Therefore, when
an area is originally zoned, the zoning board will thoroughly
consider most if not all of the factors later examined by a subdivision control agency. Although it is arguable that subdivision control agencies serve a distinct function in applying these standards
to the current state of affairs and therefore in considering changes
that may have occurred since the zoning ordinance was adopted,
the frequent practice of amending zoning ordinances and granting
41
variances should serve to rebut these arguments.
If, therefore, there are no viable distinctions between zoning
and subdivision control, the judicial response to the use of subdivision control for exclusionary purposes should be the same as
the judicial response to the exclusionary use of zoning ordinances.
One of the earliest challenges to local land use practices involved
the application of a municipality's zoning regulations. In Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 4 2 the United States Supreme
Court relying upon a due process analysis held that zoning ordi37 For a textual discussion of zoning and subdivision control systems, see D. WEBSTER,
URBAN PLANNING AND MUNICIPAL PUBLIC POLICY 362-488 (1958).
38
See, e.g., Maine's enabling statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4956 (1964).
39 D. WEBSTER, supra note 37, at 437-38.
40 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 478-80 (1968).

41 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 40, at 590-92.

42272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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nances were constitutional unless shown to be "clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare."' 4 Two basic assumptions were necessarily vital to this holding: (1) zoning is a rational
means to effect land use control; and (2) local governments are
equipped to judge the appropriateness of such regulations. Since
Euclid, the Supreme Court has generally refrained from ruling on
the constitutionality of zoning ordinances. 44 State and lower fed45
eral courts have adopted a similar "hands-off" approach.
Recently, however, challenges to local exclusionary land use
practices based upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, have become more numerous. 4 6 Courts have refused
to hold that all exclusionary land use practices are unconstitutional. 47 Indeed, the courts have refused to take even the
more limited step of striking down exclusionary zoning ordinances
that are aimed solely at the poor. 48 These same courts may
however, invalidate zoning ordinances which have the effect or
purpose of excluding racial minorities.
In Dailey v. City of Lawton49 a nonprofit housing sponsor
challenged the Lawton City Council's refusal to rezone a tract of
land in a White neighborhood where the sponsor wanted to build a
multi-family residential housing project. The district court found
for the plaintiff-sponsor, rejecting the city's claim that its refusal
to grant a zoning change had been based upon findings which
indicated that the change would place an undue burden upon
public services. 50 Rather, the court found that the reason for the
city's refusal to rezone the area was the opposition of White
4 Id. at 395.
4Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent,

21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 783 (1969).

45 Id. at 783-84. An exception to this "hands off" approach has been that taken by the
Pennsylvania judiciary. See, e.g., Appeal of Kit Mar. Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765
(1970) (township zoning ordinance requiring lots no less than two acres along existing
roads and no less than three acres in the interior was unconstitutional); Appeal of Girsh,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (township zoning ordinance not providing for apartments was unconstitutional) and 32 U. PIr. L. REV. 83 (1970).
4 One author has concluded that "exclusionary zoning ordinances seem ripe for close
consideration in terms of modern equal protection doctrine, and in many instances, may
well fail to meet the burden of justification imposed by that doctrine." Sager, supra note
44, at 798. Sager forcefully presents the arguments for and against an equal protection
approach to exclusionary zoning, id. at 785-800.
47 Id. at 784-85.
48 For an examination of exclusionary zoning and the poor, see Cutler, Legality of
Zoning to Exclude the Poor: A Preliminary Analysis of Evolving Law, 37 BROOK. L. REV.
483 (197 I).
In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the United States Supreme Court refused to
strike down on equal protection grounds article XXXIV of the California Constitution,
which required a majority community vote before low-rent housing could be constructed.
49425 F.2d 1037 (1Oth Cir. 1970).
50 296 F.Supp. 266, 267-68 (W.D.Okla. 1969).
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residents. The court held that the city could not use zoning
procedures to effectuate the discriminatory goals of its residents
and ordered the rezoning to take place. 5 1
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed, stating:
The appellants argue that a finding of discriminatory intent
is barred because the project was opposed on the grounds of
overcrowding of the neighborhood, the local schools, and the
recreational facilities and the overburdening of the local fire
fighting capabilities. The testimony in this regard was vague
and general. No school, fire, recreational, traffic, or other
official testified in support of the appellant's claims. The racial
prejudice alleged and established by the plaintiffs must be met
by something more than bald, conclusory assertions that the
52
action was taken for other than discriminatory reasons.
In Lawton the city relied on the alleged burden upon public facilities and services which the low income housing project would
create as the grounds for denying the requested zoning charge, not
upon a contention that existing statutes did not permit the construction of the housing. Thus, the rationale in this case would be
equally applicable to a subdivision control agency's decision as to
whether a plat should be authorized, since the factors the city
relied upon for rejecting the request to rezone are the same as
those which a subdivision control agency would examine.
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of
Union City (SA SSO) 53 is a major breakthrough in exclusionary
land use litigation. Here the Organization had succeeded in getting the Union City Planning Commission and City Council to
pass an ordinance rezoning a tract of land to accommodate a
280-unit medium density housing project. Immediately thereafter
the citizens of Union City rejected the ordinance in a referendum.
The Organization then brought suit alleging among other things
that their right to equal protection of the laws had been violated.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Organization, while it could not
inquire into the motives of persons voting in the referendum,
could state a sufficient claim for relief if it could show that the
the referendum was discriminatory:
If the voters' purpose is to be found here, then, it would
seem to require far more than a simple application of objective standards. If the true motive is to be ascertained not
51 Id. at 269.

52425 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 1970).
53 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
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through speculation but through a probing of the private attitudes of the voters, the inquiry would entail an intolerable
invasion of the privacy that must protect an exercise of the
franchise. [Citation omitted].

Appellants' equal protection contentions, however, reach
beyond purpose. They assert that the effect of the referendum
is to deny decent housing and an integrated environment to
low-income residents of Union City. If, apart from voter
motive, the result of this zoning by referendum is discriminatory in this fashion, in our view a substantial constitutional question is presented. 54
The importance of SASSO is its acceptance of a "discrimination
by effect" standard; the court did not focus on zoning but on the
effect of this zoning-discrimination. Once a court's attention is
directed toward the problem of discrimination, then whether discrimination is caused by zoning or subdivision control practices
will become an issue of secondary importance.
In Kennedy Park Homes Association, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna55 the city planning board's refusal to approve a subdivision plat was overturned by the courts. The local Roman Catholic
diocese had agreed to sell a tract of land to the Kennedy Park
Homes Association, Inc., so that a low-income housing project
could be developed. When this agreement became known to the
public, a campaign was initiated to prevent the sale from taking
place, 5 6 and a petition carrying the name of the Mayor and President of the City Council was circulated opposing the sale "due to
the lack of schools and inadequate sewage facilities." Subsequently, the Lackawanna Zoning Board of Appeals and the
Planning and Development Board recommended to the City
Council a moratorium on all new subdivisions until such time as
the sewage problem was solved. There was also a rezoning of the
area to provide for open space and park area.
Lackawanna did have a sewage problem. The city could trace
the minutes of its City Council meetings for over a decade to
show numerous references to its concern over the sewage problem. Indeed, Lackawanna argued that it was trying to rectify an
urgent problem which affected the health and welfare of its citizens. Nevertheless, both the federal district court 5 7 and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected
Id. at 295.
55436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971), affg 318 F. Supp.
669 (W.D. N.Y. 1970).
56
436 F.2d at I II.
17318 F. Supp. at 679-81.
54
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the city's arguments. Focusing upon the discriminatory effect of
the city's actions, the Second Circuit stated:
Lackawanna is obligated to deal with its sewer needs without
infringing on plaintiffs' rights. Even were we to accept the
City's allegation that any discrimination here resulted from
thoughtlessness rather than a purposeful scheme, the City
may not escape responsibility for placing its black citizens
under a severe disadvantage which it cannot justify. [Citations omitted]. The city must provide sewerage facilities to
the plaintiffs in conformity with the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment58and provide it [sic] as soon as
it does for any other applicant.
Like the Ninth Circuit in SASSO, the Second Circuit focused not
upon the means used to achieve the discriminatory result, but
upon that result itself. Such a rationale should apply irrespective
of whether the means used to achieve the discriminatory result
are zoning or subdivision controls.
V.

CONCLUSION

Exclusionary subdivision control practices may become more
common when cities discover that zoning ordinances are subject
to close scrutiny by the courts. Nevertheless, as the above
analysis has attempted to demonstrate, subdivision control practices should have no more success in excluding minority groups
than zoning. If the courts focus on the effect of the practice rather
than the type of practice, discrimination however achieved will
not be allowed. The fate of exclusionary subdivision control is
inevitably tied to the fate of exclusionary zoning.
-Robert E. Hirshon

58436 F.2d at 1 14.

